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interests are untouchable by subsequent legislation, has succumbed by attri-
tion from within Delaware, and disrepute from without as in New York.
The Coyne decision is of importance in the corporate world, as signifi-
cant of the growing receptiveness of courts towards the simplification of
holding and operating company relationships. Despite the fact that it will
undoubtedly be accepted by most jurisdictions, 10
 it fails to appreciate the
tenuous position of minority shareholders. These minority shareholders do
not seek to enjoin the merger simply because they disfavor merger; on the
contrary, merger to them is immaterial. They seek only to remain within
the corporate structure. Cash, even where the consideration is indisputably
fair, is of no comfort to these shareholders who, having perhaps suffered
through the lean years, now seek to reap the benefits of plentiful years to
come.
Coyne, furthermore, is distinguishable from the McNulty situation in
that the plaintiffs' interest in Coyne does not serve a legitimate corporate
purpose. In McNulty, cancellation of the cumulative preferred stock does
so since the corporation seeks to initiate a stable dividend policy with respect
to the common stock thereby increasing its marketability.
Another factor to be considered with respect to the Coyne decision is
the tax consequence to the shareholders. Shareholders, forced to terminate
their interest, may be subject to substantial capital gain taxes. To subject
these shareholders to substantial taxes, in the absence of a legitimate corpo-
rate purpose, is patently unfair. Although one obviously assumes the risk of
having his shareholder's interest terminated in furtherance of a legitimate
purpose, he does not assume such risk in its absence.
LEON ARONSON
Customs Duties—Deductions—Tarriff Act—Statutory Construction.—
international Packers, Limited v. United States.2—Plaintiff, an importer
of canned meat, brought this action in the United States Customs Court from
a reappraisement of the value of imported corned beef under the Tariff
Act.2 This merchandise had been valued at the United States sales price
less certain deductions allowable under the statute in order to arrive at the
United States value for the purpose of applying § 1402(e) of the Tariff Act.'
10 Beloff v. Consolidated Edison Company of New York, 300 N.Y. 11, 87 N.E.2d
561 (1949).
1 171 F. Supp. 834 (Cust. Ct. 1959).
2 46 Stat. 708, amended, 19 U.S.C. 1402(a, d-f) (1958).
3 The deductions that were allowed included certain allowances for ocean freight,
insurance, general expenses, profits, loading permits, stamp on bill of lading, Argentine
statistical charges, exchange, and placing on board charge.
4 § 402 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended by § 1402(e), in effect during
February 1956, at the time of the exportation of this merchandise, provided: "The
United States value of imported merchandise shall be the price at which such or
similar imported merchandise is freely offered for sale for domestic consumption packed
ready for delivery, in the principal market of the United States to all purchasers,
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Plaintiff had no quarrel with the use of the United States sales price as
the basis for an appraisement value but contended that the retention by
the Argentine Government of fifteen per centum of the purchase price paid
by the exporter, which payment was a condition precedent to the licensing
and exportation of this merchandise was a "necessary expense" from the
place of shipment to the place of delivery and thus should have been allowed
as a deduction. HELD, that such a charge by the Argentine Government
was deductible as a "necessary expense" from the place of shipment to the
place of delivery.
Although neither this Argentine retention charge nor any similar charge
had ever been presented before the Customs Court as regards the precise
issue as to whether it would be deductible as a "necessary expense," there
are cases which have dealt with similar charges in determining whether such
expense incurred by the purchaser should be added to the market value of
the goods in order to determine export value under § 1402(d) 6 It has
been held than an export tax assessed upon merchandise at the time of
exportation is not a part of the market value, for the reason that the tax
did not accrue when the manufacturer sold such or similar merchandise
but accrued only in case the merchandise was exported. 6 Therefore, where
the payment of an export tax depends wholly upon whether the merchandise
is exported from the country in which it is purchased, it is no part of the
market value thereof for the purpose of applying § 1402(d). This is espe-
cially true when the tax is not an excise upon the purchase but rather is an
extra charge on the privilege of exporting.' This rule is based upon the
reasoning that the Export Value section of the Tariff Act seeks to ascertain
the market value of goods in the foreign market at the time when such goods
are "packed ready for shipment to the United States," i.e. prior to shipment.
Consequently when such export taxes are levied at the time of the exportation
they form no part of the market value of the merchandise in the foreign
market as contemplated by the valuation statute.8
The Customs Court relied heavily upon its more recent decision in
United States v. International Commercial Co., Inc.9
 There again the basis
of valuation was not United States value, but value f.o.b. Buenos Aires. The
at the time of exportation of the imported merchandise, in the usual wholesale quantities
and in the ordinary course of trade, with allowance made for duty, cost of transportation
and insurance, and other necessary expenses from the place of shipment to the place
of delivery...."
e § 1402(d) of the Tariff Act, in substance provides that the export value of
imported merchandise shall be the market value or the price which similar merchandise
is freely offered for sale to all purchasers in the principal markets of the country
from which exported, for exportation to the United States plus all costs and expenses
incident to placing the merchandise in condition, packed ready for shipment to the
United States. § 1402(e) is applied for Tariff Act purposes only in the event that either
§ 1402(c) or § 1402(d), whichever is higher, is inapplicable.
6 Sternfeld v. United States, 12 Ct. Cust. App. 172 (1924).
7 51 Treas. Dec. 9 (1927).
8 Gee Co. v. United States, 24 Cust. Ct. 508 (1950).
9 26 Cust. Ct. 607 (1951); aff'd, 28 Cust. Ct. 629 (1952).
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Court held that a "charge" of twenty per centum imposed by the Institute
Argentina de Promotion del Intercambio (Corporation for the Promotion
of Trade) did not accrue until the merchandise was about to be exported
and therefore was a charge or expense that accrued after the merchandise
was packed, ready for shipment, and as such could not be added to the
export price for the purpose of determining export value.
In order to render a decision in this case, it was necessary for the court
to interpret governing Argentine law, and in construing such the Court found
that in October 1955, the Argentine Government found it necessary to
readjust foreign exchange controls in order to gradually work toward a free
market. It was decreed that part of the proceeds from the negotiation of
foreign exchange, arising from the controlled exports should be retained by
the Government. 10
 Accordingly, the Argentine Central Bank regulations
provided that all official market exports from the country were to be made
against pre-payment or an irrevocable letter of credit opened before ship-
ment. These shipments were made against a revolving irrevocable letter
of credit. Before the bank could certify the Solicitud de Embarque (applica-
tion for shipment), it would liquidate the letter of credit by converting the
United States dollars to Argentine pesos at the rate of eighteen pesos to one
United States dollar and would then deduct the fifteen per centum retention
tax from the total peso equivalent. Without the bank's certification of the
Solicitud de Embarque it would be impossible for the purchaser to export
the merchandise.
The Customs Court in the present case reasoned as follows. Inasmuch
as the Commercial Company case held that the Argentine charge did not
accrue until after the merchandise was packed ready for shipment, and,
hence, this sum should not be added to the export value, and since the
Argentine Retention tax was not a charge after delivery into the United
States as an United States Internal Tax would be;" and considering that
it would be impossible to export the merchandise without having made the
payment, it must necessarily follow that such a charge is a "necessary
expense" from the place of shipment to the place of delivery.
This case illustrates the type of problem that the Customs Court is
faced with when litigation before it requires construction of foreign laws and
their operation in relation to the exportation of goods to the United States.
Where the laws and official documents in original text are in another
language, and are in evidence in the English translation only, the opportu-
nities for confusion, contradiction, and misunderstanding are considerable.
In such a case it is important to resolve any conflict that may appear as to
foreign law, according to the legislative intent.
The decision in the present case seems fair enough if the Customs
Court is to be consistent. Having previously established that similar
retention charges are not to be included in determining Export Value
10 Decree of Argentine Gov't 2002/55 (Oct. 27, 1955), see International Packers
supra note 1 at 856.
11 Burleigh Brooks v. United States, 69 Treas. Dec. 1404 (1936).
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specifically because they are levied on the act of exportation itself, it must
logically follow that if the expense is "necessary" it must be allowable as a
deduction in applying § 1402(e) of the Tariff Act.
EDWARD D. SULLIVAN
Indemnity Contracts—Express Provisions Required for Indemnification
for Negligence.—Metropolitan Paving Co. v. Gordon Herkenhoff
Assoc.'—A property owner brought an action against the city and a road
contractor for damages to his property caused by their alleged negligence
in the construction of a detour in preparation for the building of a bridge
by the contractor. The city filed a third party complaint against the engi-
neering firm which had prepared the plans alleging that the engineer's
negligence was the proximate cause of the damage. Thereafter, the con-
tractor filed a counterclaim against the engineer. The engineer, filed a motion
to dismiss the third party complaint and counterclaim or, in the alternative
for summary judgment, on the grounds that a contract entered into between
the engineer and the city with the road contractor contained a provision by
which the contractor indemnified the city and the engineer against all claims
arising out of any act of omission, misfeasance, malfeasance by the con-
tractor. The trial court granted the engineer's motion for summary judg-
ment. On appeal, the Supreme Court of New Mexico affirmed. Held: It is
not necessary to expressly provide for indemnification against negligence in
the indemnity contract since the contract clause was broad enough to
encompass protection against claims arising out of the indemnitor's negli-
gent acts.
The validity of contracts indemnifying against loss caused by negligence
is universally recognized.2 However, difficulties are encountered in the con-
struction of indemnification agreements wherein the parties fail to refer
expressly to negligence. The cardinal rule of interpretation of these contracts
is the same as that encountered in any other type of contract, namely the
ascertainment of the intention of the parties. 3 In the overwhelming majority
of cases, the result reached by the court's interpretational efforts can be
condensed into the simple rule that where the parties fail to refer expressly
to negligence in their contract, such evidences the parties' intention not to
provide for indemnification against negligent acts. 4 This appears to be the
1 66 N.M. 41, 341 P.2d 460 (1959).
2 Sinclair Prairie Oil Co. v. T. Stuart & Son Co., 260 Mass. 242, 177 N.E. 540
(1927); Thompson-Starett v. Otis Elevator Co., 271 N.Y. 36, 2 N.E.2d 35 (1936).
3 In First Trust Co. v. Aredale Ranch & Cattle Co., 136 Neb. 521, 531, 286 NW.
766, 772 (1939); the court held: "The general rules which govern the construction and
interpretation of other contracts apply in construing a contract of indemnity and in
determining the rights and liabilities of the parties there under."
4 cacey v. Virginia R. Co., 85 F.2d 976 (4th Cir. 1936); Southern Bell Tel. &
Tel. Co. v. Meridan, 74 F.2d 983 (5th Cir. 1935); Boston & M. R. Co. v. T. Stuart
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